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A. JASON MIRABITO

The Control of Technology Transfer:
The Burke-Hartke Legislation and the
Andean Foreign Investment Code:
The M Faces the Nations
What has happened in the 1960s and continues is that American corporations, via
licensing agreements ...

and other international arrangements, have given away

for a very small portion of real cost and value . . . advanced technology and with it,
the jobs it created.'
• . . [N]ational enterprises must have the best possible access to modern technology
and new administrative practices of the contemporary world. At the same time, it is
necessary to establish efficient mechanisms and procedures for the production and
protection of technology in the territory of the subregion and to improve the terms
under which foreign technology is acquired." 2
I. Introduction
Recent unemployment and balance of payment problems in some capital
exporting and importing countries have produced reactions, protectionist in the
broadest sense, either to tighten or loosen the reins on the flow of technology
transfers across national borders. For the purposes of this paper, two political
areas are considered in their attempts to control this flow of technology: the
United States and the Andean Group. The United States, for its part, has
produced the Burke-Hartke legislation. 3 The Andean Group, presently
consisting of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, has
promulgated the Andean Foreign Investment Code.' Although the BurkeHartke bill, now defunct as such, would have regulated international trade
practices in addition to technology transfers (including such matters as curtailment of certain preferential tariff treatment, 5 deletion of the foreign tax

'S1awnaent of Nathaniel Brenner, Director of Marketing, Coates & Welk Corp., reported in
Goldfinger, The Casefor Burke-Hartke, 6 COL. J. WOR. Bus. 24 (Sp. 1973).
2
Decision No. 24, adopted Dec. 31, 1970, by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, 11
I.L. Mats. 127 (1971).
'The Burke-Hartke Bill, S. 2592, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 10,914, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971); [hereinafter cited as Burke-Hartkel.
'The Common Rigime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses,
and Royalties, 11 I.L. Mats. 126 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as AFIC].
5
Burke-Hartke, supra, note 3, § 703.
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credit," and reforming of the anti-dumping laws'), the discussion in this
paper will be limited to those sections of the bill that would have regulated
technology transfer, those sections specifically relating to the tax treatment of
property transferred abroad8 and that regulating the transfer of patented
technology abroad. 9 The exercise is by no means academic, since some, if not
many, of these sections might well be resurrected in other enactments.
Technology can be defined as the "application of science to the solving of
well-defined problems. While scientific knowledge may have wide application
and form the basis of several technologies, technology is developed along a
much narrower front."' 0 Thus, technology is very different from inventiveness
and is rather putting inventiveness into practice. It is in this transformation that
United States business is most efficient.
The Andean Code (AFIC) from its side of the equator would limit and control
the amount and type of technology that could be transferred to the Group from
foreign countries. " Like the Burke-Hartke bill, the provisions contained in the
AFIC go far beyond the narrow field of technology transfer and regulate such
matters as mandatory divestment,' 2 the repatriation of investment capital and
remittance of profits' 3 ; but consideration of these aspects of the AFIC are far
beyond the scope of this paper which have been adequately explored by others. '
The Burke-Hartke bill was largely prompted by United States balance of
payments problems and the fears of organized labor that domestic jobs were
being exported overseas, and, with them, the United States-origin technology
that had made these jobs possible, thereby permanently removing the technological advantage the United States had in the type of technical knowledge
exported. 's The promulgation of the AFIC rules was initiated by the balance of
payments difficulties of the Latin countries and the widening technological gap
6
between the developed and the developing world.'
This article will focus on these two pieces of legislation, as well as other
domestic and foreign laws and practices affecting technology transfer. Such

'Burke-Hartke,
7
Burke-Hartke,
'Burke-Hartke,
0
Burke-Hartke,

supra,
supra,
supra,
supra,

note 3,
note! 3,
note 3,
note 3,

§
§
§
§

103.
401.
105.
602.

I°E.P.

HAWTHORNE, THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 19 (1971).
"AFIC, supra note 4, arts. 18, 20, 25, 54, 55.
"AFIC, supra note 4, arts. 27, 28.
"AFIC, supra note 4, arts. 7-11, 21, 37.
'C. T. Oliver. The Andean ForeignInvestment Code, 66 A.J.I.L. 763 (1972).
'"CONG. REC. 33583 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971) (statement of Sen. Hartke), "The transfer of U.S.
technology is a matter of concern to government officials and trade experts .... This bill would help
stop the export of American jobs due to transferred technology."
ITIhe economic and scientific-technology gap between the developing world and the developed
nations, has widened and is continuing to widen and the external obstacles that act as a brake on the
rapid economic growth of the Latin American countries have not only not been reduced; they are on
the rise." Latin American Consensus of Vina del Mar, May 17, 1967, 8 I.L. Mats. 974, 976 (1969).
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unilateral action will be demonstrated, it is believed, to be inadequate in
addressing a multilateral problem. A multilateral, perhaps inter-American,
solution may be desirable, if not essential. "The urge that is common to concerned groups in both capital exporting and capital receiving countries is that
the disorder and vagueness of the existing transnational legal system be
' 7
replaced with rules."
II. The Comparative Economic Situation in
the United States and In Latin America
Regarding Technology Transfers
As the Burke-Hartke legislation and the AFIC were both prompted, in some
sense, by an increasingly deteriorating trade balance in Latin America and the
recent balance of payments and trade deficit difficulties of the United States, it
appears appropriate to examine the extent of these economic problems.
A. Latin America
A United Nations study in the 1960s covering 6 LDCs, 18 reported that
payments by these countries for technology licenses (including patents,
trademarks, and know-how) amounted to about 7 percent of their combined
exports and more than 1/2percent of their combined gross domestic product.
The payments for foreign technology paid by thirteen LDCs totaled $1.5 billion,
which was more than half of the amount of the total flow of direct private
foreign investment to these LDCs.19 The payments for foreign technology are
increasing annually, at an estimated increase of 20 percent a year, which will
have the effect of absorbing an even greater proportion of LDCs' earnings. 20
Between 1961 and 1968, Latin America had a deficit-on current accounts in
its balance of payments. In its trade balance, in 1968, latin American exports
totaled $12 billion, and imports were $10.6 billion, giving an initial surplus of
$2.6 billion. But adding a deficit of $3.6 billion for services, investment charges
(flows for services, insurance, return of capital, and services on debt) gave Latin
America an overall trade deficit in 1968 of about $2.2 billion. In the share of
markets, the Latin share dropped from 7.2 percent in 1961 to 6.7 percent in
1968.21 Ironically, during this period in which foreign investment was increasing
in Latin America, Latin America's market share had dropped.

'Oliver, supra, note 14, at 763, 764.
"8Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria and Sri Lanka.
"MultinationalCorporationsin World Development, Report of the Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973).
2
Transfer of Technology, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, U.N. Doc.
TD/106 (1971).
"These figures are taken from Symposium, the MultinationalEnterprise, 8 HOUSTON L. R. 457,
462, 463 (1971).
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In 1967, the exports from Latin America were made up from the following
groups: Primary Products 87 percent, Semi-Manufactures 8 percent, Manufactures 5 percent.22 On the other hand, in developing the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 73 percent of the exports
were in manufactured goods. 3 Thus, Latin America remains dependent on
unstable-priced agricultural products for the bulk of its export earnings, while
export earnings from manufactured goods are pitifully small. The Latin
Americans want these manufacturing exports to increase, since industrialization is regarded as a tenet of the economic development of these countries. Yet,
if payments for technology transfer increase, especially for technology that is
"old" or otherwise not suitable for development of an export industry, the net
increase in Latin American manufacturing development would be at a minimal
rate. The continuation of this situation is, of course, one reason for the promulgation of the Andean Group's Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign
Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties. 24
The amounts spent in Latin America for research and development are very
little, adding up to not even .1 percent of the gross national product, far less
than the proportion spent in the developed countries, especially the United
States. It is evident that a firm R & D base is needed for a strong domestic
technology. Latin America also has the lowest world-wide percentage of
students enrolled in scientific education programs, and the diffusion of
2
technological knowledge is quite poor. 1
B. The United States
As the Latin American economic situation has become increasingly worse, the
United States position with respect to technology transfers has improved.
Receipts and payments of royalties of United States companies in recent years
have been as follows: in 1964 receipts were (in millions of dollars) 1057, and
payments, 127, giving a positive balance of 930; in 1969 the receipts had
increased to 1,892, and payments to 221, thus giving a net positive balance of
1671.26 Thus, the transfer of technology abroad has produced positive effects on
the United States balance of payments, although the figures are not quite in

21d., at 464.
"Id.
2
"AFIC, supra note 4.
2SThe Process of International Transfer of Technology: Some Comments Regarding Latin
America, Department of Scientific Affairs, General Secretarial OAS, SA/PE 49, at 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as OAS Transfer of Technology].
"American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, The Burke-Hartke Foreign Trade
and Investment Proposal, Legislative Analysis No. 4, 93rd Cong., Feb. 23, 1973, at 22 (Table 22)
[hereinafter cited as AEI].
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agreement for the 1964-69 period. 27 Tariff Commission figures show the net
receipts for royalties were 1780 millions in 1971.28
United States investment in Latin America grew from $8.3 billion in 1960 to
$13.8 billion in 1969. More than $2.4 billion is presently invested in the Andean
Pact states29 (except Venezuela). However, although on first glance this increase
may appear impressive, the figures are deceiving because during this same
period United States investment was increasing world-wide. Between 1950 and
1973, the ratio of United States investments in Latin America dropped from 32
percent to 20 percent whereas the principal area of growth of investment was in
Europe. 30
Therefore, it is clear that the United States balance of payments has benefitted from technology transfer, with receipts from such transfers amounting to
$19.8 billion between 1960 and 1971, and payments of $1.8 billion, resulting in
a net income of $18 billion. 3' The Tariff Commission reported that "with
imports of low technology items and raw materials increasing rapidly, exports of
high technology goods have been the principal factor preventing the United
States trade deficit from reaching levels even higher than those recently
experienced." 32 The extent to which the United States is involved in technology
transfer overseas is perhaps reflected in the number of patent applications filed
overseas by U.S. nationals. Of some 62,000 applications before the United States
Patent Office (in 1968), foreign protection was sought for 23,000 of these by the
filing of over 115,000 applications in other countries.33 With respect to foreign
ownership of patents in developing countries, in Greece, for example, of a total
of 3,277 patents granted in 1967, 2,302 were to foreigners; in Portugal, out of a
total of 1,129, foreigners obtained 1,045.14 Technology transfer has helped the
United States. The benefits transferred to Latin America are somewhat
doubtful."3

"The figures are from the Department of Commerce.
"United States Tariff Commission, Implications of Multinational Firmsfor World Trade and
Investment and for U.S. Trade and Labor, Report to the Committee on Finance of the United
States Senate and its Subcommittee on International Trade on Investigation No. 332-69, under
Section 332 of the TariffAct of 1930, T.C. PUBLICATION 537 (January 1973), at 599, Table 7 [hereinafter cited as T.C. Rep. 332-69].
"$846 million in Chile, $684 million in Colombia, $704 million in Peru, $220 million in Bolivia
and in Ecuador; see P. Schliesser, Restriction on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common
Market, 5 INT'L LAW 586, 587 note 4 (1971).
"Multinational Corporations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. at 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as MNE Hearings].
"MNE Hearings, supra note 30, at 198.
"T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra note 28, at 570.
"FULDA & SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 540 (1972).
"E. P. HAWTHORNE, supra note 10, at 47, 48.
""[Tihe MNCs, in their transactions with the United States, exert a uniformly large, negative
impact on the current accounts of balance of payments of the host countries. (Conversely, of course,
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C. The Transfer of Technology v. DirectInvestment
Often a United States corporation desiring to invest abroad has three main
choices: 1) establishing a foreign plant; 2) negotiating licensing agreements
transferring its technology to a foreign company; and 3) a combination of both.
Most firms prefer to transfer to an already existing subsidiary because in that
way technology is kept within the corporate structure. By choosing the second
route, the United States firm loses control over the transferred technology in the
non-legal sense. This would appear to be true in a transfer involving patents and
trade secrets, whereby disclosure or sale to an unrelated party does not assure its
remaining a secret. However, there are reasons for preferring the leasing or sale
of technology in certain instances. 3" The Japanese have been successful in
retaining national ownership of businesses by, using Professor Kindleberger's
term, "taking the foreign investment package apart." 37 By this method, they
purchase only the license, or type of information desired, without the costs to
the host country of having to invite a foreign company within its borders in order
to receive the technology. The success of such a method of acquiring technology
depends, of course, upon whether the host state can utilize the technology itself
without the foreign assistance that goes along with the package deal. Though
this is possible in a developing country like Japan, it probably is not in Latin
America, so, generally technology sold to a Latin American country will be in
such a package. This package selling is an advantage to the United States
corporation, but ordinarily not to the Latin American state. Accordingly,
Article 20(a) of the AFIC prohibits such package selling to the Andean Group.

they have a favorable impact on the corresponding accounts of the U.S. balance of payments),"
T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra.note 28, at 29.
3
MNCs may favor licensing over direct investment where (a) the market is too small to warrant
investment, or the product cycle or proprietary position is ephemeral; (b) the firm has a marketable
technology but lacks the resources or experience for more expanded direct investment; (c) further
direct investment is precluded by legal restraints or seems to involve high risk and uncertainties of a
political or economic nature; (d) reciprocal benefits are obtainable through cross-licensing; (e)
patent litigation or competitive technological development may thereby be avoided; (f) it provides an
entree to foreign markets without as large a capital outlay as that required for a direct investment;
(g) royalty taxes are lower than corporate taxes on business conducted through a permanent
establishment; (h) a firm can establish its trademarks and maintain its foreign patent rights abroad
through licensing arrangements; (i) licensees can explore the foreign market for a product, saving a
U.S. firm money which might otherwise have been invested unwisely; or (j) it is a means of complying with governmental restrictions, both domestic and foreign, on overseas investment without
entirely giving up market presence (e.g., there has been no alternative to licensing in Japan, where
incoming direct investment flows have been officially restricted, and severely so, during the postwar
period); T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra note 28, at 596, 597.
I'C. P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMics 272 (5th ed. 1973).
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D. Technology, R & D and the MNE
As mentioned above, in order for the very low percentage (5 percent) of total
Latin exports comprising manufactured goods to increase, technology must be
imported into Latin America, probably from the United States, and almost
exclusively through the MNEs because "only they can provide the marketing
skills and production techniques required." 38
Nonetheless, certain Latin American economists view technology transfer
from the United States as "dependent industrialization," in which technology
transfer has helped Latin America somewhat but has benefitted others more
and this "at the cost of establishing an economy split by technical dualism,
preserving internal structures of domination, not altering the colonial
foundation of the primary-exported economy and adding to traditional forms of
financial and commercial dependence a new dependency: technologicalfinancial colonialism." 39 This criticism is most evidently true in technology
transfer contracts in which the Latin American transferee is prohibited from
exporting products made by that transferred technology. This practice, of
course, does little good for Latin American export trade. Article 20 of the AFIC
would negate agreements containing this prohibition from exportation. °
We then reach the question of what type of technology United States
businesses are transferring to Latin America: is it developmental technology
that might allow Latin America to establish its own product lines for export, or
merely state-of-the-art or even old technology that does not contain future
developmental opportunities? J. J. Servan-Schreiber, the perceptive French
writer, popularized in the 1960s 4 the idea that the technology that his country,
France, was getting, for example, in the computer field, was of the third
generation variety whereas United States industry was currently using the fourth
or fifth generation, permanently keeping France in a technologically inferior
position. Agreeing with this position, the Tariff Commission found that "MNEs
do not, on balance, export their first line technology either to their own affiliates
or to unrelated foreigners. Rather, this first-line technology tends to remain in
plants at home. . . . This hypothesis "explains" the continued, strongly
favorable, direct impact of the MNEs on U.S. trade, and it suggests that the
large and rapidly rising income from royalties and fees comes mainly from

"Statement by James P. Grant, President Overseas Development Council, 66 A.J.I.L. 21 (1972).
"'Garcig, Industrializacidny Dependencia en America Latino, 38 TRIMEsTRE EcON6MIco 731
(1971).
"'...[N]o clauses shall be accepted in which exportation of the products manufactured on the
basis of the technology is prohibited in any way," art. 201, AFIC, supra note 4, at 133.
'j. J.SERVAN-SCHREIBER, LE DEFI AMERICAIN (Eng. ed 1967).
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exports of technology of a slightly older and less competitive variety than that
'
which is retainedfor domestic use. [emphasis supplied]" 42
Furthermore, most United States MNEs spend their money for R & D in
laboratories within the U.S. Thus, in 1966, the MNEs spent $7.6 billion on
R & D within the United States and only $526 million abroad (or only 6 percent
of their total R & D spending). Seventy-two percent of that spent overseas was
concentrated in Canada, the United Kingdom and West Germany.43 From a
narrow outlook, this centralization of R & D does make some sense, since a
United States research team can rely upon related technology that is easily
available in the United States but not so easily available within any Latin
American country. Those foreign companies which have established overseas
laboratories do more development work than pure research, that is, developmental work like adapting a United States-origin product to the host country's
needs (as by adapting an automobile to European safety standards). 44 One
,important reason for a United States company establishing research facilities
abroad would be, however, to assimilate a particular technology in the host
country that might be more advanced than in the United States and to bring this
technology back to the United States. With respect to Latin America, this
isolation of R & D away from its shores continues to make it dependent upon
United States (and other foreign) technology and prevents an indigenous
technology base from emerging. Suggestions to alleviate this problem will be
discussed below. Of the small amount of R & D done in Latin America, some of
it was in the clinical testing of drugs by United States companies, where the
Food and Drug Administration's strict regulations had prevented such testing
within the United States. It has been charged by some Latin groups that this
4
practice uses our friends to the South as "guinea pigs."
III. The Status of the Law Regarding
Technology Transfer: The Multilateral Approach
Obviously, by international agreement the transfer of technology in the field
of patents can be facilitated or hindered. The present section deals with the
principal multilateral agreement in that field.
The first international agreement dealing with patents was the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 46 adopted in Paris in 1883.
There have been three revisions of this Convention: in London in 1939, in

1432T.C.

Rep. 332-69, supra, note 28, at 49, 50.
T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note 28, at 581.
"T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note 28, at 585.
"OAS Transfer of Technology, supra note 25, at 52.
'Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, adopted 1883 in Paris, 1 U.S.T. 24,
T.1.A.S. No. 4931 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
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Lisbon in 1958, and at Stockholm in 1967. The Convention establishes the
following international rules:
(1) The principle of national treatment by which nationals of each contracting country are granted the same rights regarding industrial property
47
protection as the countries grant their own nationals;
(2) the right of priority-by which a national of a contracting state who has
made a patent application in one state and in another contracting state,
if he files such application within a prescribed time (one year for patents,
six months for trademarks), can claim the date of the first filing as the
date of all subsequent filings;48
(3) the rights given to foreign patent-holders of restrictions or sanctions for
failure to "work" the patent, a period of grace for the payment of fees
and annual taxes, and abolition of forfeiture as a penalty for the importa49
tion of goods made by the patentee in another country.
The United States is a Contracting State to the Paris Convention, as amended
in Stockholm in 1967 (but only as to the new administrative provisions of the
latter). The Latin American countries that are Contracting States to the Paris
Convention are Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Brazil. Inasmuch as no member states of the Andean Group are signatories to
the Paris Convention, none of these states is bound by the Convention to grant
national treatment to foreigners. This is important to them in restricting patents
from entry into the Andean Pact countries from foreign states as is provided on
a non-national treatment basis by Article 26.50 There is also some question of
whether the Burke-Hartke bill is in accord with Article 5 of the Paris
Convention. This aspect will be discussed below.
IV. The Status of the National Laws
Regarding Technology Transfers
A. The United States Law Prior To Burke-Hartke
1. TAX CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO LATIN AMERICA
Various United States tax provisions exist by which technological property,
patented and otherwise, can be transferred overseas with favorable tax
treatment. These transfers are especially easy when made to the LDCs.
a. Section 1249 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 1249 of the 1962

47Id., Art. 2.
4'Paris Convention, supra, note 46, art. 4.

4Paris Convention, supra, note 46, art. 5.
'°AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 26, at 135.
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Revenue Act"' is designed to tax certain income as ordinary income that
formerly had been given capital gains tax treatment. Prior to 1962, the transfer
of patents, secret processes and other industrial property to a controlled foreign
corporation could be accomplished with taxation only on a capital gains basis.
Under 1249, as stated, those transfers are now treated as ordinary income.
b. Section 367. Section 367 allows tax-free transfers of property, including
industrial property (patents and trademarks) to its foreign subsidiary. To obtain
this tax-free treatment, the corporation must get an advance ruling from the
Internal Revenue Commission, which requires a showing that such transfer is
not for the purpose of tax avoidance. If the ruling is not sought and obtained,
the proceeds of the transaction are taxed at the ordinary income rates of section
1249. The Burke-Hartke bill, to be discussed in the section below, would have
changed this provision in section 105 of that bill.
c. The LDC Corporation. The LDC Corporation emerged as one aspect of the
United States plan of financial aid to the LDCs (among whose number are the
Andean countries) by encouraging investment in those countries. Under section
955(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, an LDC Corporation is defined as one
that derives at least 80 percent of its gross income from sources within an LDC
with at least 80 percent of its assets located there. The curtailment of the foreign
tax credit that had occurred in the 1962 Revenue Act 2 is inapplicable to an
LDC Corporation. Also, Code section 954(b)(1) permits controlled foreign
corporations to exclude income, dividends, and interest from Subpart F in the
case of an LDC investment.5 3 This preferential foreign tax treatment with
respect to LDCs was due to a finding that investment in LDCs results in a more
favorable tax dollar return to the United States than an investment in a
developed country. "
d. The Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation.The Western Hemisphere
Trade Corporation tax preference system was begun in 1942.55 Such a corporation is one that does all its business in the western hemisphere, derives at least
95 percent of its income from foreign sources, and derives at least 90 percent of
its income from its trade. A qualifying corporation receives a reduction of 14
percent of its United States tax. Like the LDC Corporation, which was designed
to encourage investment in Latin America, The Western Hemisphere Trade
Corporation was intended to benefit corporations engaged in manufacturing or
other industrial activities in Latin America. American exporters which have

"Revenue Act of 1962, 76 Stat.
'2T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note
53
T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note
5'T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note
Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat.

960, amending IRC of 1958 s.79.902.
28, at 874 et seq.
28, at 884.
28, at 882.
798, ch. 619, § 141.
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manufacturing operations in Latin America have been able to take advantage of
this tax preference to increase the profits on their export operations. 56
In this manner, encouragement has been given to United States corporations
to invest in Latin America and to transfer industrial property there on generally
more favorable terms than such transfers to developed countries. This relatively
free transferability of technology is one incentive Burke-Hartke sought to
curtail.
There have been suggestions that Section 1249 be amended to benefit the
LDCs. "It would seem at the very least that where developing countries are
concerned the United States would wish to encourage the exportation of noncompetitive technology as a particularly useful, yet inexpensive form of foreign
aid. An even better approach might be the enactment of legislation exempting
an indirect technology transfer from section 1249 application where the transferor can demonstrate that he was not motivated by tax avoidance.""7
2. SOME UNITED STATES ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS
CONCERNING LICENSING
Another problem arises when a licensing agreement restricts the competitive
freedom of either the licensor or licensee. In the United States, a patentee or
trademark owner can impose certain restrictions on his licensee if these
restrictions remain within the sphere of the monopoly protection granted by the
patent and trademark laws. The licensor of a patent can, for example, restrict
his licensee to a particular territory or to a certain quantity of the patented
article. 18
However, even if the restriction placed on the licensee is not considered to be
within the monopoly patent grant, it must be determined if the restriction can
be considered as being in accord with a main lawful purpose. For example, an
agreement prohibiting the licensee from challenging the validity of his licensor's
patent goes beyond the rights granted in a patent. 9 In the international field,
however, a restrictive clause that may be objectionable in principle may not have
the requisite effect on the foreign or international commerce of the United
States. 60 In one case, 61 restrictions in a foreign license agreement were held

"T.C. Rep. 332-69, supra, note 28, at 883.
"Technology Exportation, 23 SYRACUSE L.R. 1, 29, 30 (1972).
"Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 F.358 (7th Cir. 1907); United
States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
"Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"Pugh & Smit, Materials on International Business Transactions in the Common Market (unpublished work by Columbia University School of Law, 1973) [hereinafter cited as EEC Law] Part
VII B, at 183.
'Sperry Products Inc. v. Aluminum Company of America, 171 F. Supp. 901, 936-38 (N.D. Ohio
1959), modified on other grounds, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961).
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permissible in the absence of a showing of a direct and substantial harmful
effect upon American foreign commerce. Post sale restrictions on patents are
normally not enforceable under domestic patent law since the monopoly grant
to the patentee is extinguished upon sale.
If imposed by contract, these restrictions may constitute patent misuse and
even a violation per se of the Sherman Act.62 On the horizontal level, post sale
restrictions on licensing agreements have already been adjudicated as illegal per
se under Sherman. 63 With respect to price fixing, in United States v. General
Electric Co., 6 it was held that a patent licensor may fix the licensee's sales price
for the patented article. In McCollough v. Kammer Corp.6 1 the court found that
a provision in a licensing agreement that the licensee could not deal in
competitive products in the territory assigned to him was invalid. But, in
Transparent Wrap. Machine Corp. v. Stokes and Smith Co. 66 a clause in a
licensee's agreement for a grant back of improvement patents the licensee might
secure was held by the Supreme Court not to be illegal per se. In Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.6 the Court stated that the use of patents to
force payment of royalties on licensed goods by the licensee which he did not use
constituted patent misuse.
However unrelated these cases may appear to the Andean Code, their relation
to Article 20 sections a) through h) will become evident when Article 20 of the
AFIC, which regulates the particular licensed technology allowed to be
transferred, is discussed below.
B. The Burke-Hartke Bill
In introducing the Senate version of the Burke-Hartke bill, 68 a bill"... to
stem the outflow of U.S. capital, jobs, technology and production .... " its
sponsor, Senator Vance Hartke stated, "Without [the bill] the heavy export of
jobs, technology and capital by companies based in this country will continue
unabated .. .[T]he technology produced by American genius will be better
supervised and controlled, so that American workers are more fully benefitted
69
by these advances."9
As mentioned, the bill was all pervasive, and would have changed many areas
in U.S. laws affecting the operation of MNEs overseas, if it had become law.

12E.E.C. Law, supra note 60, part VII B at 186; see Hensley Engineering Co. v. Esso Corp., 383
F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
"Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatmall Measuring Systems Co., 169 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa.
1958); affd per curiam, 268 F.2d 395 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959).
"United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
"SMcCullough v. Kammer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948).
"6Transparent Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
"Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 295 U.S. 100 (1969).
'IS. 2592, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), H.R. 10,914, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
"CONG. REc. 33583, (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1971).
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However, only those sections dealing with technology transfer, of which there
are two, will be examined.
First, section 105 of the bill would have amended Section 367 of the I.R.C.
(see discussion of present Section 367 above). As will be recalled, Section 367
requires that if tax-free treatment is desired, in a transfer of property from a
parent company to its subsidiary, an advanced ruling from the Commissioner
must be sought. If the ruling is not obtained, the transfer is taxed at ordinary
income rates.
Section 105 of the bill would tax the gains from all such transfers as ordinary
income and delete the advanced ruling procedure. Even at present, however,
tax-free transfers under Section 367 are permitted only when the transfer is
made in lieu of payment for the exchange of stock. Since 1966, the tax realized
in this type of transfer has amounted to more than 1 billion dollars a year. 0 The
bill's opponents stated that Section 105 could hurt the competitiveness of
United States foreign subsidiaries because their competitors in those countries
would presumably have access to equivalent technical data, yet Section 105
would not make domestic production in the U.S. any more competitive. 7'
Also, opponents have stated that it is wrong to imply, as does Section 105,
that normally income received from licenses and transfers of patented
technology to foreign corporation is not taxed under present law. The amount of
revenue the United States receives, as already mentioned, confirms this fact.
Thus, it seems that enactment of a provision like Section 105 of the bill would
decrease the amount of technology exported (and such would be undesirable for
both the United States and the host country's position, the latter because
technology transfers can be used to increase native technical skills and help
increase employment in those countries. Latin America, of course, is badly in
need of both.
Title VI, "Foreign Investment and Technology Export Controls," Section 602
of the bill, makes certain changes in United States laws regarding patents.
Under Section 602(a), the President is authorized "to prohibit any holder of a
United States patent from manufacturing the patented product or using the
patented product, or from licensing others to manufacture the patented
products or using the patented product, outside the territory of the United
States when in the judgment of the President such prohibition will contribute to
increased employment in the United States [emphasis added]."
The penalty for violation of Section 602(a) is set out in section 602(b) and is a
rather strong deterrent in which the patent will be unenforceable in the United
States courts or, in other words, loss of patent protection. These sections give

7

AE1, supra, note 26, at 16.
"AEI, supra, note 26, at 17.
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broad powers to the President, who can act at his discretion (or indiscretion).
Also, it is unclear how many United States jobs would have to be threatened
with loss before the President can act under Section 602(a). If the flow of
technology were stopped or curtailed on a large scale, the net positive effects on
United States balance of payments from royalty payments to the United States
would be stopped or curtailed accordingly.
Section 602(a) also raises questions of the international responsibility of the
United States in the 1883 Paris Convention, discussed above. On one hand,
some states require patents actually to be used (worked) to keep their validity.
The prohibitions provided by the bill for "using or licensing . . . outside
the ... United States" would cause the United States to lose foreign markets to
foreign competition without patent protection. A foreigner could copy the
technology in a United States patent and use it freely without paying royalties to
the United States company that spent money and time developing that
technology.
The Burke-Hartke bill is believed by some writers to be similar to a French
law of the 19th century requiring the forfeiture of patents if products embodying
the patented technology were imported into France from abroad. Article 5A(1)
of the Paris Convention negated such types of laws by providing that the
"introduction by the patentee into the country where the patent has been
granted of objects manufactured in any of the countries of the Union shall not
involve forfeiture." 7 Burke-Hartke, Section 602, would allow the President to
violate the Paris Convention much as France did a century age. 73
It should be noted at this point that the United States does not have, contrary
to the belief of some, a monopoly of all things, including technology. In fact,
technology transfer is a two-way street, and United States industry also benefits
from the transfer of foreign technology. The Wankel and the jet engine are
obvious examples of this, both of which originated in Europe. A United States
license to a foreigner is sometimes used to get access to certain foreign
technology. "Companies will grant licenses for the use of their industrial
property rights to obtain reciprocal rights from foreigners and to enhance their
chances of obtaining such licenses in the future where the parties' roles are
reversed." 74
An OECD study has shown that of 140 companies importing technology, 60
percent had originated in the United States; but there were more American
inventions based on foreign breakthroughs than there were foreign inventions
based on United States discoveries." Also, a recent ECAT study showed that
whereas 89 percent of the corporations studied transferred technology abroad,
"Paris Convention, supra, note 46, Art. 5 (A) (1).
"Statement of Lawrence Ebb, Counsel, General Electric Co., 66 AJIL 17, 18 (1972).
"D.B. Aenoff, Licensing as a Means of PenetratingForeign Markets, 14 IDEA 292, 299 (1970).
"AEI, supra, note 26, at 21.
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69 percent also in turn received foreign technology. 76 "[Tihe companies queried
stated that the licensing of technology abroad had made possible exports of
capital goods, parts, and components which otherwise would not have taken
place. Thus, it may be argued that the international flow of technology in these
instances contributed to employment in the United States." 77
A recent Tariff Commission report on MNEs stated that the overseas
operations of MNEs had contributed half a million jobs to the United States
(and, of course, had contributed more jobs in LDCs like the Andean states
where unemployment is high). 78 In sum, the controls that Burke-Hartke would
have put upon technology transfers would have had the reverse effect as
intended, and would have made worse the United States balance of payments
situation.
C. The Latin American Laws Dealing with the
Transfer of Technology, Priorto the AFIC
In recent years, regulations similar to those of the AFIC have been promulgated in Latin American states outside the Andean Group. Like the AFIC,
which will be discussed below, these controls are basically concentrated in two
areas: (1) regulations that would be placed, in United States terms, under the
heading of patent antitrust; and (2) tax rules affecting technology transfers. It
will be recalled that United States regulations were considered above under
these two headings. The most startling aspect of these Latin American laws is
their similarity to the ANCOM Pact, which would lead one to hope for some
future harmonization of these laws throughout Latin America.
1. ARGENTINA
Argentina, which is not an ANCOM member, has instituted the following
controls affecting technology transfer:
a. Control of Technology Transfer. A regulation" of 1971 provides that
foreigners who wish to receive payment for the transfer of patents, trademarks,
or know-how to Argentine nationals must register the proposed agreement with
the National Register of Licenses and Know-How Agreements. Under Article 3
of the above law, the administering agency, the Ministry of Commerce and
Mining may refuse registration for reasons including disproportionate prices,
availability of the technology within the country, tying agreements, export
prohibitions, and the filing of resale prices." 80 The agency can regulate the
license fees paid to the foreigner by the Argentine national.
"AEI, supra, note 26, at 23.

"AEI, supra, note 26, at 23.
"IMNE Hearings. supra, note 30, at 401 et seq.
"Law 19, 231 published Sept. 15, 1971.
"L. Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign Investment Laws, 6

64. 69 (1972).
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b. Tax Aspects of Technology Transfer in Argentina. Together with the
recent changes with respect to technology transfer, Argentine tax law has also
been changed somewhat. The tax for payments of technical assistance which,
until recently, enjoyed a deduction of 50 percent before the imposition of a tax
of 41 percent (giving a 20.5 percent rate) was increased in 1971 to 32.8 percent.
81
This same rate is applicable to royalty payments for patents and trademarks.
In Argentina we see some tightening of the reins on the free transferability of
technology, a trend evident in other Latin American states.
2. BRAZIL
a. Control of Technology Transfer. In Brazil, also a non-ANCOM member, a
new Industrial Property Code was promulgated in 1971. " The law requires that
the National Institute of Industrial Property give its approval to the requests of
foreigners for royalty fees for the transfer of patents, trademarks, and knowhow rights. 83
b. Tax Aspects of Technology Transfers in Brazil. Until 1958, remittances
for royalties and foreign technical assistance fees could be made without limit
and with full deductibility, with a tax of only 25 percent. 84 With the passage in
1962 of the exchange control law, the situation changed. Deductions for income
tax purposes for technical and scientific advice are limited to the first five years
of the corporation's operations in Brazil. Royalties from trademarks are not
deductible, and no royalties or technical service payments are deductible if
made to a parent company. No remittances are permitted for patent and trademark rights made to parent companies."
3. MEXICO
a. Control of Technology Transfer. In 1972, a new Technology Law was
declared in Mexico86 which requires the registration of patent, trademark, and
technology agreements in the National Registry of Transfer of Technology.
Agreements that are not registered cannot be considered valid. 8 7 The law
makes illegal certain clauses usually contained in such agreements. Article 7

"Figures taken from, Technology and IndustrialProperty Licensing in Latin America, 6 INT'L
LAW. 388, 396, 397 (1972).
"2Law 5722, Dec. 21, 1971, DOU-1 of Dec. 31, 1971.
'P. Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign Investment Laws, 7 INrr'L LAW.
357, 369 (1973).
'BRAzIL INCOME TAX REoS., art. 292(1), 309.
'IF. M. Lacey, Technology and Industrial Property Licensing in Latin America: A Legislative
Revolution, 6 INT'L LAW. 388, 401 (1972).
"Technology Law, published in the Official Daily of Dec. 30, 1972, from ALI-ABA Course of
Study, MNE: Legal and Related Problems, Apr. 25, 26, 1973, at 55-64.
"Id., art. 6.
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of the law enumerates 14 clauses that are prohibited which must be taken into
consideration by the Secretary of Industry and Commerce.
Among the prohibitions are: (a) the transfer when the technology desired to
be transferred is freely available in Mexico, 8 (b) clauses in which the foreign
transferor will take part in the management decisions of the transferee,89 (c)
clauses in which the use of complementary technology is prohibited, 9 ° (d)
clauses that fix sale or resale prices, 91 (e) clauses that prohibit the exportation of
the goods produced under the license, 9 (f) clauses by which the transferee must
transfer improvement patents to the transferor,9 3 (g) clauses by which materials
used in producing the transferred technology must come from a particular
source,94 and (h) clauses in which the transferee must sell his output to the
transferor. 9 A comparison of these prohibitions to similar provisions in the
AFIC is interesting and perhaps not quite coincidental.
b. Tax Aspects of Technology Transfer in Mexico. Prior to the passage of the
1971 law, Mexico had taxed royalty payments at a higher rate than technical
services. Since 1971, royalties from patents and trademarks and technical services have been taxed at a rate that rises progressively to a maximum of 42
percent together with an additional gross receipts tax of 3 percent.96
D. The Andean Foreign Investment Code
The Andean Subregional Integration Agreement was signed in Cartagena,
Colombia, on May 26, 1969 by the representatives of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru. Venezuela became a member on February 13, 1973. Under
the Agreement, the objective is to create an Andean common market that will
be in operation for all member states in 16 years.
In 1970, the Commission of the Agreement97 promulgated Decision No. 24,
the Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks,
Patents, Licenses and Royalties. 98 The Decision was implemented as a result of
member governments' proposals for the adoption of "standards that will
facilitate the use of modern technology, without limiting the market for

"Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (I).
9
"Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (III).
0
"Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (VIII).
"Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (XI).
2
Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (VII).
3
Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (IV).
'Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (VI).
"Supra, note 86, at art. 7 (IX).
"For an excellent discussion of technology transfer controls in other Latin American countries,
see generally the works by P. Schliesser, supra notes 29 and 83 and by F. M. Lacey, supra note 85.
"The Commission is the supreme agency of the agreement with a president who serves a term of 1
year's duration.
"AFIC, supra note 4.
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products manufactured with foreign technical assistance. . ..

"

The Com-

mission then declared that "national enterprises must have the best possible
access to modern technology ...of the contemporary world ... [1]t is necessary
to establish effective mechanisms

. . .

under which foreign technology

is

acquired." 100
To that end, all patent, trademark, and technical assistance agreements
providing for foreign transfers to a member state must be registered with the
1
Control Office, 10
which can oppose the proposed transfer. Whether the transfer
will be approved would depend on the "effective contribution of the goods
incorporating the technology." 0 2 Secondly, a rather important provision of the
Code is that contained in Article 20 which provides that certain clauses in
technology transfer agreements would not be permitted. These clatuses- include:
(a) Clauses by virtue of which the furnishing of technology imposes the obligation
for the recipient country of enterprise to acquire from a specific source capital goods,
intermediate products, raw materials, and other technologies or of permanently
employing personnel indicated by the enterprise which supplies the technology. In
exceptional cases, the recipient country may accept clauses of this nature for the
acquisition of capital goods, intermediate products or raw materials, provided that
their price corresponds to current levels in the international market;
(b) Clauses pursuant to which the enterprise selling the technology reserves the right
to fix the sale or resale prices of the products manufactured on the basis of the
technology;
(c) Clauses that contain restrictions regarding the volume and structure of
production;
(d) Clauses that prohibit the use of competitive technologies;
(e) Clauses that establish a full or partial purchase option in favor of the supplier of
the technology;
(f)
Clauses that obligate the purchaser of technology to transfer to the supplier the
inventions or improvements that may be obtained through the use of the technology;
(g) Clauses that require payment of royalties to the owners of patents for patents
which are not used; and
(h) Other clauses with equivalent effects.
There is also in Article 20 a rule established that: "Save in exceptional cases,
duly appraised by the competent authority of the recipient country, no clauses
shall be accepted in which exportation of the products manufactured on the
3
basis of the technology is prohibited or limited in any way."'10
The above rules which apply to future agreements are supplemented by
Article 26 which applies the prohibitions of Article 20 to agreements already in
effect in member states.

"Id.. at
'°AFIC,
'AFIC,
'°2AFIC,
' 3AFIC,

126.
supra note
supra note
supra note
supra note

4, at 127.
4, art. 6(f) at 131.
4, art. 18, at 132.
4, art. 20, at 133.
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A perusal of the prohibitions contained in Article 20 reveals several things.
The prohibitions listed are very much like those contained in the Mexican and
Argentine regulations that were discussed above. This perhpas represents then,
the common set of rules which Latin American states, Andean or otherwise,
believe foreign transferors of technology should comply with. The similarity of
these Latin American Laws can facilitate compliance by the foreign investor
since he will not have to learn about and comply with many varied national
laws. 104

Although the antitrust regimes in Latin America are non-existent or, at the
most, very weak, the prohibitions contained in Article 20 could be viewed as a
form of patent antitrust by a United States antitrust lawyer. A comparison of
Article 20 prohibitions and patent licensing clauses that are violative of the
United States antitrust laws will reveal a number of instances of agreement
between the two. In one sense, with the issuance of the Article 20 rules, a United
States investor now will have to act in Latin America much the same as he has to
do with domestic patent licensing clauses.
In Article 21, the remittance of royalties from patents and trademarks is
prohibited and such royalties are not deductible for local tax purposes.I" This
provision coincides with recent regulations in the other Latin countries
discussed above that now impose a higher tax burden on foreign enterprises
technology transfers than in the past.
The Commission is desirous of building up Andean subregional technology
and has provided in Article 23 for: (1) special tax treatment to encourage the
development of subregional technology, 06 (2) the development of export goods
to third countries from the Group produced with subregional technology, 7 and
(3) the channeling of domestic savings for the establishment of subregional
R & D.' 0 8
It is evident that the Andean Group still wants (and needs) foreign technology, but only such technology as will not keep their technology subservient and
dependent on that from the transferor nation. They also appear to appreciate
that an effort should be made to develop and indigenous R & D base for subregional technology that eventually could be used to enable regional
technologically intensive products to compete in the world market. This effort is

"'Thus, a foreign transferor knows that in a technology transfer to either Mexico or Bolivia, a
clause that fixes resale prices is prohibited (by art. 20(b) of AFIC, and art. 7 (XI) of the Mexican
law).05
' AFIC, supra note 4, at 133, art. 21 declares: "When ... [Intangible technology contributions]
are furnished to a foreign enterprise by its parent company or by another affiliate thereof, no
payment of royalties shall be authorized and no deduction will be allowed in this connection for tax
purposes."
"'AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 23(a), at 134.
'°'AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 23(b), at 134.
'08AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 23(c), at 134.
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sensible, since it is often the case that the technology transferred to LDCs is
outdated and provides little opportunity for the development of export products
based on that transferred technology.
In view of the rather strict restrictions on conditions of business entry by
foreigners produced by the ANCOM Pact, including, of course, the regulations
of the Code requiring divestment which have not been discussed, it is to be
wondered whether United States MNEs will continue to invest in the Andean
states. There are several factors miliating against leaving, however. First,
United States investment in the Andean nations, not including Venezuela, is
put at $2.4 billion-just too large an amount to consider "packing one's bags
and leaving." ' 9 Also, ANCOM states import about $1 billion in goods
from the United States annually. They may decide to find other sources
for their imports if U.S. business leaves the area.110 Then, there is a danger that
if United States companies leave the Andean territories, the MNEs of other
developed nations who are willing to live under the AFIC will take the United
States companies' place within the Andean market. Yet, as of May, 1973,
United States investment had not decreased and "ANCOM officials
contend [ed] that foreign investment and offers of technology are on the rise.""'
V. The AFIC Versus The Burke-Hartke Bill
One of the Burke-Hartke bill's purposes was to prevent the export of United
States-based technology. The AFIC is designed to restrict the import of certain
types of technology. It appears as if one country (the United States) is telling the
others (the Andean nations) that they cannot have the type of technology that
they do not want.
Labor, the driving force behind the Burke-Hartke bill, contends that the
export of technology overseas exports United States jobs and creates more
balance of payments difficulties for the United States. However, it appears, al
contrario, that the receipt of royalty fees by the United States corporations for
technology licensed abroad has had a net positive effect on the United States
balance of payments. " 2
In addition, MNE operations have contributed to domestic employment,
despite labor's contention that the opposite is the case." 3 Also, a Tariff
Commission study, in measuring the impact on domestic employment, found

"'The MNE in the Context of Latin American Economic Integration: The Andean Agreement

Model, 11

L. R. 245, 261 (1973).
Bus. 26 (July-Aug. 1971).

SAN DIEGO

106 COL. J. WOR.

."Wall St. Journal, May 21, 1973, col. 1, at 6.
" MNE Hearings, supra note 30, at 198.
"'While U.S. private sector employment grew at a rate of 1.8% a year, and manufacturing at .2
percent a year, domestic employment grew at 2.7 percent a year; MNE Hearings,supra note 30, at
197.
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that MNEs overseas operations had contributed half a million additional jobs
on the United States market, as mentioned earlier." 4
Labor's statements that the MNE is exporting technology are quite correct.
However, their analysis appears to stop at this point and does not consider
various statistics showing the additional jobs created that would not have
existed had the MNEs not transferred technology abroad.
Labor sees itself faced with a rising domestic unemployment rate and has
found a convenient kicking post in the MNEs. It has presented a believable,
albeit false, argument that if X number of jobs are created abroad, there must
be a corresponding loss of X jobs on the domestic labor market.
An AFL-CIO official, commenting upon a current magazine article that
suggested that someday MNEs would isolate themselves on some neutral
territory to act without interference from even the largest governments, said,
"In a nation founded to preserve the rights of people to elect officials to
represent their interests, it seems odd that even national magazines are
reporting that there is some inevitable force that will do away with governments
as representatives of the people.""I It is submitted that pseudo-patriotic statements like that above do not get to the real problem: does the export of
technology also result in a new export of United States jobs? The answers of
various studies discussed here refute such allegations, and establish the
opposite.
Those provisions of Burke-Hartke that would have restricted the transfer to
technology would have had adverse effects, including halting the "reverse flow"
of technology from abroad to the United States and, viewed from a foreign aid
standpoint, this curtailment of technology transfer would also have denied Latin
America badly needed modern technology.
Having reviewed the technology transfer limitations which the bill would have
imposed, its Latin counterpart, the AFIC, merits discussion at this point, to
assess its possible effects and benefits.
The controls imposed upon the transfer of technology by foreigners in the
AFIC (and for the same reason those broader controls like divestment) would be
characterized by Professor Kindleberger as a consequence of the "nationalist
sentiment." "[The] nationalist sentiment is understandable and normal, but it
is noneconomic ....

All the economist can rightly do is ask the decision makers

to recognize that nationalism has a cost and they should be prepared to decide
how much they want at what cost." 11 6 To some extent, AFIC controls reflect this

sentiment, and to some extent they make sense.
WNE Hearings, supra note 30, at 401 et seq.
'Statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO, before the
Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics on the Export of Technology, Production and Jobs, July 28, 1971.
"'C. P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 267 (5th ed. 1973).
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Firstly, controls of the type contained in Article 20 of the AFIC containing
certain clauses prohibited from licensing agreements are, on the whole, good.
Perhaps the most important restricted activity contained in Article 20 is the
provision that "no clause shall be accepted in which exports of the products
manufactured on the basis of the technology is prohibited or limited in any
way.""' 7 It is believed that if the transferred technology is to benefit Latin
America, it must provide for, at least at some future date, the opportunity to
compete in the world export market. The present practice by which the
technology is used by the transferee to produce goods for sale back to the
transferor will achieve little in developing exports and technological skills in
Latin America, skills through which Latin America can someday have its own
technology base.
The provisions of Articles 23 and 24 are aimed at producing a subregional
technology in the Andean Group with the aim of encouraging the development
of exports to third countries of products manufactured using Andean
technology. Article 55 calls for the "establishment of a subregional system for
the development, promotion, production and adaptation of technology."" 8
In order for the Andean Group to export products of subregional technology,
it also is necessary to get that technology, and that is done partly by establishing
R & D facilities. As noted above, most United States MNEs have the great bulk
of their R & D labs in the United States. One means of assuring that viable
technology is transferred to Latin America would be by conditioning the
approval of license agreements by the ANCOM authorities upon assurances for
the establishment of R & D labs within the host country. "I This can also be
done by conditioning such approval upon the agreement by the transferor to
include a compulsory licensing clause in the licensing agreement by which the
host country can acquire the latest as well as state-of-the-art technology.' 2
The establishment of R & D facilities within the Andean countries will
produce a trained native group of technicians who can help develop a subregional technology. A recent OAS study 12 similarly called for an "adequate
process of importation of technology, through proper selection, adaptation,
application and importation of imported technology, and their dissemination,
as well as an export promotion of technology as an encouragement and incentive
for the domestic creative capacity."

' 7 AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 20, para. 3, at 133.
"'AFIC, supra, note 4, art. 55, at 142.
1'lThis has been suggested in E. P. HAWTHORNE, supra note 10, at 56.

"OSee discussion in U.S. Investment in Latin America, 4
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(1972).
2'A Wider Scope for Science Policy in the Seventies: A Policy for Technical Progress,
Department of Scientific Affairs, General Secretariat OAS, SA/PE-50, at 6, 7 (1973).
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At present, the Andean countries can not achieve technological competitiveness alone, but need help from the United States to establish a firm subregional
technology.
It is submitted that rules like that embodied in the Burke-Hartke legislation
will thwart such efforts as well as reducing the benefits of technology transfers to
the United States.
Also, technology transfers can improve the employment picture of Latin
America. A recent study of the International Labor Organization concluded
that "in the economic progress of developing countries there is probably no
factor as important as the choice of technology for the production 'of goods.
Technology has the greatest impact on employment: on the number employed,
on the types of jobs offered and skills needed, on the diversification of product
lines and consequently on the range of skills developed, and on the current and
122
future structure of the labor force."'
If used wisely by our Latin-American neighbors, the ANCOM regulations
relating to technology transfer, should not scare away United States business
investment in the Group; and the types of technology permitted to be
transferred can benefit these countries greatly. However, since the regulations
have only been in effect a very short time, the effectiveness of the Code cannot
yet be assessed. It is believed possible, however, for both the United States and
the Andean Group mutually to benefit from the transfer of technology.
VI. The Inter-American Technology Agency
Since the problems of technology transfer are truly multilateral, possibly a
multilateral body to coordinate these transfers may be useful. Efforts on one
side, exemplified by the Burke-Hartke legislation, and, on the other, by the
Andean Code, will result in rules reflecting national interest policies which may
well conflict with the national interest of the other party.
Latin America needs and wants United States technology, subject to certain
conditions set out in the AFIC. The United States wants, or should want, to
transfer that technology to get back royalty payments beneficial to the United
States balance of payments, increased domestic employment, and a reverse flow
of technology. Professor Hirschman has suggested the creation of an interAmerican organization that will coordinate and fix divestment plans between
the United States MNE and the Andean Group.I23
Perhaps a similar inter-American agency, under the auspices of the OAS,
dealing with technology transfers would be feasible. An OAS study has sug-

"' 2 .L.O., The RelationshipBetween MultinationalCorporationsand Social Policy, Geneva 1972,
at 45.

.2 A. Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America and Why,

FINANCE

(No. 76, 1969) at 12.
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gested such an organ, but restricts its scope to only an inter-Latin American
group.124 This writer believes that any organ that can deal with the problem
effectively must, of necessity, include both the transferees and the transferors,
Latin America and the United States.
The type of an agency envisaged could be based on a suggestion in a recent
OECD study. 2 ' This "Inter-American Technology Agency" would be
responsible for defining the national priorities of both home state and host state
in the technology transfer field. It could establish criteria by which decisions on
whether certain technologies should be transferred could be based, conduct
studies on the effects of existing and proposed transfers, and generally act as a
forum in which the transferor and transferee could meet and consult before
taking unilateral actions such as that envisaged by the Burke-Hartke legislation
and the AFIC provisions.

2

'The Transfer of Technology to Latin America, Department of Scientific Affairs, General
Secretariat OAS ScA/Ps-1, at 176 (1972).
115E. P. HAWTHORNE, supra note 10, at 15, 104, 105.
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